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RECENT CASE NOTES
CONTRACTS - CONSIDERATION - Appellee and the Windswift Farms
entered into a contract for the purchase and sale of foxes for which the
appellee agreed to pay $1,500 and the Windswift Farms agreed to ship the
foxes at a certain date, furnish pens, feed, care and attend to the breeding
of all foxes ranched from the appellee, etc. Appellee paid $500 down and
agreed to pay the balance of $1,000 by two notes which he executed and
enclosed with the order for the foxes. Appellant is the holder in due course
of the notes and brings suit thereon. Appellee in his answer pleaded,
among others things, no consideration and failure of consideration, but
before the argument withdrew all of the answer except no consideration.
Held, for appellant: that there was a valuable consideration, and appellee
will be held to the theory of no consideration so adopted by him even if the
evidence did show a failure of consideration. Salt Springs Nat. Bank V.
Schlosaer, Appellate Court of Indiana, April 25, 1930.
The court said that consideration, that is a valuable consideration, in
the sense of the law, may consist either in some right, profit, or benefit
accruing to one party, or some forebearance, detriment, loss, or responsi-
bility given, suffered, or undertaken by another. Undoubtedly there is
some authority for this statement. Starr v. Earle et al., 43 Ind. 478;
People v. Commercial Life Ins. Co., 247 IMI. 92; Ward v. Erie R. Co., 149
N. Y. S. 717. Evidently two theories of consideration were intended to be
adopted, benefit to the promisor and detriment to the promisee. A right,
profit or benefit accruing, seems to suggest the idea of benefit to the
promisor, but there is authority to the extent that this is not sufficient
consideration for a promise. Keith v. Miles, 39 Miss. 442; Springstead v.
Nees, 125 App. Div. (N. Y.) 230; DeCicco v. Sehweiger, 211 N. Y. 431;
Deveewn v. Shars, 69 Md. 199. It is doubtful if at the present time there
has been or can be formulated a definition of benefit to the promisor which
would be generally accepted. While courts often speak of such there are
few cases which hold that benefit to the promisor is sufficient consideration.
Willis, "What is Consideration in the Anglo-American Law of Contracts,"
72 U. of Pa. L. R. 245. Forebearance, detriment, loss, or esponsibiity
given, suffered, or undertaken by another convey no legal meaning. Most
of the cases hold that unless a person surrender or promise -o surrender,
a legal right, a legal power, a legal privilege, or a legal immunity, there
is no consideration. Willis, "What is Consideration in the Anglo-American
Law of Contracts," 72 U. of Pa. L. R. 376. The court also said that an
agreement to do something, as well as mutual promises, affords sufficient
consideration for commercial paper. An agreement is an expression of
mutual assent by two or more persons. It has a wider meaning than
contract, bargain or promise. The word contains no implication that
legal consequences are or are not produced. American Law Institute's
Restatement of the Law of Contracts, official draft, Chap. 1-7, p. 21.
Mutual promises are considerations. Oscar Lehlegal Mfg. Co. v. Peter
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Cooper's Glue Factory, 231 N. Y.' 459; Green v. Whaley, 271 Md. 636;
Stearns v. Barnett, 18 Mass. (1 Peisk) 443. But the court could have gone
farther in its definition. Any act or promise will be sufficient considera-
tion under the bargain theory, except (1) where there is an act or fore-
bearance required by a legal duty that is neither doubtful nor the subject
of honest and reasonable dispute if the duty is owed either to the promisor
or to the public, or, if imposed by the law of torts or crimes, is owed to any
person; (2) where there is the surrender of, or forbearance to assert an
invalid claim or defense by one who has not an honest and reasonable
belief in its possible validity. American Law Institute Restatement of the
Law of Contracts, Official Draft, Chaps. 1-7, Secs. 75, 76, 86, 87, 88, 89, and
90. The result reached here is correct but the court could have safely
adopted a definition of, consideration substantially similar to that adopted
by the American Law Institute in its Restatement of the Law of Contracts.
The decision apparently is based upon contract law, but even though the
court had in mind consideration in bills and notes, the result would not
have been different. Every negotiable instrument is deemed prima facie
to have been issued for a valuable consideration; and every person whose
signature appears thereon to have become a party thereto for value. Value
is any consideration sufficient to support a simple contract. Negotiable
Instruments Law, sections 24 and 25. Burns' Annotated Statutes, 1926,
Vol. 3, sections 11388 and 11384. C. F. B.
CONTRACTS-RECOVERY UNDER VOID AGREEMENT-Plaintiff and defend-
ant had entered into a contract whereby plaintiff was to take over the
execution management of, and to underwrite, the defendant company for
20 years. The contract was declared void, after the parties had transacted
considerable business under it, because it was against public policy. Plain-
tiff sued to recover for services rendered and money advanced on the faith
of the unlawful contract. Held, claim for recovery of unused portion of
fund advanced by plaintiff, and for recovery of another sum involving six
unexplained items, allowed. In the course of its opinion, the court said:
"Courts have very generally striven to do justice between the parties by
permitting property or money parted with, or services rendered on the
faith of such unlawful contracts, to be recovered or compensated for, not-
withstanding the invalidity of the contract." Sherman & Ellis, Inc. v.
Indiana Mutual Casualty Co., 41 Fed. Rep. (2nd) 588.
The general rule is that the law will not enforce a contract founded on
a violation of law. Clarke v. Southern Ry. Co., 69 Ind. App. 697; buance
v. Merchants' Legal Stamp Co., 231 Mass 113; Jackson v. City of Columbia,
217 S. W. 869; Railroad Stores v. Fabyan & Co., 197 N. Y. S. 815. Nor
will it aid either party to an alleged contract, but will leave them both
where it finds them. Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Knox, 202 Ala. 694;
International Coal & Mining Co. v. Industrial Commission, 293 Ill. 524;
Baylston Bottling Co. v. O'Neill, 231 Mass. 498; People v. Carlin, 181
N. Y. S. 389. The reasons generally accepted for the observance of this
rule are: (1) it operates to inflict punishment upon plaintiff for partici-
pating in unlawful transactions; McCullen v. Hoffman, 174 U. S. 639
(2) It warns those contemplating illegal transactions that they enter upon
